










De nombreuses études récentes ont mis en doute l’interprétation traditionelle de Leibniz comme 
idéaliste depuis, au moins, la composition du Discours de métaphysique (1686). En particulier, dans 
un nouveau livre Daniel Garber affirme qu’entre la fin des années soixante-dix et la fin des années 
quatre-vingt-dix Leibniz soutient une doctrine réaliste selon laquelle le monde créé est peuplé de 
substances corporelles étendues. En tâchant de prouver sa thèse, Garber fait appel à un document 
écrit en 1690 où Leibniz, en répondant à une objection de Michelangelo Fardella, nie que les corps 
sont composés d’âmes, déclare que les âmes sont des formes substantielles, et affirme que les corps 
sont composés plutôt de substances. Selon Garber, ceci montre qu’alors Leibniz croyait que les 
corps étaient composés, non pas de substances simples, mais de substances étendues possedant 
des âmes. Ici je tâche de montrer que, bien au contraire, le document mentionné (ainsi que deux 





In his recent book, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, Daniel Garber argues that in the period 
stretching roughly from the late 1670s to the late 1690s “Leibniz had not yet come upon the mon-
adological metaphysics that will characterize his later years,” and that what one finds in this period 
instead is “a metaphysics grounded in corporeal substance, extended unities of matter and form.”1 
In the course of presenting his argument for this claim, moreover, Garber appeals to a document 
that has come to be known as the “Fardella memo” (A VI, 4 B, 1666-71), a text of 1690 in which 
Leibniz can be found responding to some objections made against his views by the Cartesian 
scholar Michelangelo Fardella. In particular, Garber observes that we find Leibniz claiming in this 
text that a body is not composed of souls, but of substances, and that “the soul, properly and accu-
rately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form or the primitive form existing in sub-
stances, the first act, the first active faculty.”2 And this claim, Garber argues, shows that at this 
 
1 Daniel Garber: Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, Oxford - New York 2009 (hereafter: Leibniz: Body), p. 
xix.  
2 A VI, 4 B, 1670: “Anima autem proprie et accurate loquendo non est substantia, sed est forma sub-
stantialis seu forma primitiva inexistens substantia, primus actus, prima facultas activa.” The translation 
is quoted from: G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, trans. by R. Ariew and D. Garber, Indianapolis – Cam-
bridge 1989 (hereafter: AG), p. 105. 
Pre-publication version 
 2 
point in his philosophical career Leibniz was not an idealist, but instead believed in the existence 
of extended corporeal substances; for it shows that, according to Leibniz, “bodies are made up of 
corporeal substances that are not themselves souls but which have souls.”3  
Garber’s discussion of the Fardella memo in his book is rather brief, but he there refers his 
reader to an earlier article of his in which he discusses this text at greater length.4 Some caution is 
required when we turn to what he says in this article, however. For here Garber holds that, in the 
bulk of his correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz espoused a sort of “weak realism,” more specif-
ically, the view that corporeal substances exist, but only as organized and substantially unified 
collections of monads.5 In his book, by contrast, Garber holds that in the 1680s and 1690s (and so 
during his correspondence with Arnauld) Leibniz espoused a more robust realism, according to 
which corporeal substances exist as genuinely extended entities that aren’t reducible to simple sub-
stances or monads. What’s more, although Garber’s article makes the case that in the Fardella 
memo Leibniz has in mind corporeal substances when he claims that bodies are aggregates of sub-
stances, rather than aggregates of souls, it nonetheless expresses—surprisingly—some doubts 
about whether the memo should be understood as a rejection of idealism. It may well be, Garber 
cautions, that in the memo Leibniz was primarily concerned to argue against the Cartesian concep-
tion of body as pure extension, and that he did not have a stable position on the issue of idealism 
when he wrote it.6 In his book, however, Garber makes no mention of this possibility and shows 
no qualms about taking the memo as firm evidence against idealism in Leibniz’s thought at the 
time of the memo’s composition.  
These differences notwithstanding, Garber’s earlier article on the Fardella memo is worth con-
sidering as a supplement to his discussion of the memo in his book, for although the article sounds 
a note of caution that is not echoed in the later work, it also presents a couple of arguments for the 
conclusion that Leibniz has in mind corporeal substances when he claims in the memo that bodies 
are aggregates of substances, rather than aggregates of souls.  
 
3 Garber: Leibniz: Body, p. 92. See also: Robert Sleigh, Jr.: Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their 
Correspondence, New Haven 1990, p. 100, and Pauline Phemister: Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, 
Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy, Dordrecht 2005, pp. 91-9.  
4 For the reference, see Garber: Leibniz: Body, p. 90, n. 127. The article referred to is Daniel Garber, “Leib-
niz and Fardella: Body, Substance, and Idealism” (hereafter: Fardella), in: Leibniz and his Correspondents, 
ed. P. Lodge, Cambridge 2004, pp. 123-140.  
5 Garber, “Fardella”, pp. 134-5. 
6 Garber, “Fardella”, pp. 137-8. 
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I shall therefore discuss these arguments in the present paper, since my aim here is to argue 
that Garber’s conclusion is mistaken. I shall be arguing, more specifically, that a careful reading of 
the Fardella memo actually undermines Garber’s claim that Leibniz advocated a robust sort of 
realism during the 1680s and 1690s, especially when read in conjunction with two other short texts 
(A VI, 4 B, 1672-4) that the editors of the Academy edition have published, together with the 
Fardella memo, under one and the same heading (“Communicata ex disputationibus cum Fardella”)—
and this not unreasonably, since these two texts seem to contain further reflections on that objection 
of Fardella’s which prompts Leibniz to declare that bodies are not aggregates of souls, but aggre-
gates of substances.7  
In fact, I shall be arguing here that, although one brief comment at the very end of one of the 
two short texts might be taken to suggest that Leibniz was open to the possibility of recognizing 
corporeal substances, understood as substantially unified collections of simple substances, still, his 
stated view in the Fardella memo and its associated texts is that bodies are aggregates of simple 
substances. For, like Robert Adams, I take it that the substances out of which Leibniz understands 
bodies to be aggregated are simple or spiritual, and that when Leibniz denies that bodies are ag-
gregates of souls, his claim is informed by the view that, strictly speaking, a soul is not itself a 
simple substance, but a simple substance’s entelechy or primitive active force, which constitutes a 
substance only in conjunction with the simple substance’s prime matter or primitive passive force.8 
 
The Fardella Memo 
We know that Leibniz was in Venice during February and March of 1690, that he met the 
Franciscan friar and Cartesian philosopher Michelangelo Fardella there, and that he explained 
some of his metaphysical views to the Italian scholar. Indeed, the Fardella memo, which is dated 
March 1690, opens with the following comment by Leibniz:  
 
I communicated several of my metaphysical thoughts to the Reverend Michel Angelo 
Fardella of the Order of Friars Minor, because I saw that he combined meditation on intel-
lectual things with an understanding of mathematics, and because he pursued truth with 
 
7 Garber reports that the manuscripts of these two texts are bound together with the manuscript of the 
Fardella memo in the Leibniz Archives in Hannover (Garber: “Fardella”, pp. 128-9). Garber himself 
doesn’t discuss the two texts in this article, on the grounds that they “don’t really add anything to” his 
“story” (Garber, “Fardella,” p. 129). He doesn’t discuss them in his book, either. By contrast, Donald 
Rutherford thinks that Garber’s reading of the Fardella memo is undermined by a consideration of these 
two texts. See pp. 168-70 of Donald Rutherford: “Leibniz as Idealist,” in: Oxford Studies in Early Modern 
Philosophy (2008) 4, pp. 141-90. To my mind, Rutherford is right about this. 
8 Robert M. Adams: Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, New York - Oxford 1994, pp. 274-7. 
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great ardor. And so, after he grasped my views, he wrote out certain propositions at home 
to remember them in order to master what he heard from me, along with objections, which, 
it so happens, he sent to me for my examination.9 
 
In the immediate wake of this introductory note, we find, in Leibniz’s handwriting, a proposition 
concerning God’s predetermination, followed by the statement of an objection that is explicitly said 
to be from Fardella (“Dubium R. Patris”). This is in turn followed by a “declaratio” in which Leib-
niz addresses Fardella’s concerns. Next, we find a second proposition, which takes the form of a 
brief sketch of Leibniz’s conception of the pre-established harmony, including his view that each 
substance mirrors the entire universe by virtue of perceiving it confusedly. In its wake, Leibniz 
notes that no “objection was made against this proposition”10 and suggests that this may be because 
the friar took his objection to the first proposition to apply to this second one as well. Finally, Leib-
niz comes to a third “proposition,” which is actually a survey of several related claims that Leibniz 
makes about bodies and their relations to substances, together with several arguments offered in 
support of these claims. Whether this “proposition”—or either of the previous two—is Fardella’s 
own account of what Leibniz had earlier told him is unclear; it may instead be Leibniz’s summary 
of what he had told Fardella in conversation, which he chose to include in the memo in order to 
offer some context for the objection that follows it.    
The account of Leibniz’s views on body begins with a brief argument for the conclusion that 
“a body is not a substance, but an aggregate of substances.” The argument begins with the claim 
that being divisible is incompatible with being a substance, since substances are unities whereas 
divisible things are pluralities. Granted this, and the claim that every body is divisible into smaller 
bodies, it follows that bodies, assuming they exist, are not substances, but aggregates of substances, 
i.e., infinite multitudes. Thus, the account continues, bodies can only exist if substances do, every 
substance being something to which true unity belongs. Moreover, since being divisible necessarily 
involves being a plurality, the substances out of which bodies are aggregated must be indivisible. 
That is, being a true unity involves being indivisible. Therefore, if there were no indivisible sub-
stances, there would be nothing outside the mind that answers to our perceptions of bodies: 
 
9 A VI, 4 B, 1666: “Communicavi Ro. Patri Mich. Fardellae Ordinis Minorum cogitationes meas Meta-
physicas complures, quod eum cognitioni Matheseos rerum quoque intelligibilium meditationem ad-
junxisse, et magno veritatem ardore prosequi viderem. Ipse igitur percepta sententia mea sibi domi 
propositiones quasdam literis consignavit memoriae causa, ut quae a me audierat complecteretur, ad-
junctis dubitationibus, quae ita habent, ut ipse mihi ad examinandum communicavit.” The translation 
is from: AG 101.  
10 A VI, 4 B, 1668/AG 103. 
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“bodies would not be real, but appearances only, or phenomena like the rainbow, every basis of 
composition having been taken away.”11 However, the account goes on to caution, this is not to say 
that indivisible substances are parts of bodies; they are instead “essential inner requisites” (requi-
situm internum essentiale) , for a part must be of the same kind as the whole to which it belongs, and 
the substances out of which bodies are aggregated are altogether different in kind from bodies. In 
the same way, a point is not a “compositive part” (pars compositiva)  of a line, but it is necessarily 
required for the existence of a line.  
What’s more, the account continues, it follows from all of this that I am an indivisible sub-
stance, the permanent and constant subject of all my actions and passions, or that, in a human 
being, there is an incorporeal immortal substance distinct from the body, the latter never remaining 
the same because of a continual change in its parts. The union of soul and body in a human being, 
moreover, consists wholly in the non-causal connection that obtains between the two by virtue of 
the pre-established harmony. Created substances generally exercise no causal influence over each 
other. Moreover, what’s true of human beings is likely true of plants and animals as well, so that 
they too probably have immortal souls, as human beings do.  
This summarizes the remarks that precede the statement of Fardella’s objection to “proposi-
tion 3.” The objection itself reads as follows:  
 
With respect to a multitude of stones, A, B, C, stone A or B or C must be understood first. But 
it is not the same with a soul, which does not constitute a body with other souls. And it seems 
that there is some difficulty in this piece of reasoning: ‘There are bodies in the universe ag-
gregated from substances. Therefore, it is necessary that there be something which is a single 
indivisible substance.’ For this would be legitimately inferred to follow if  this unity intrinsi-
cally composed an aggregate as a part of the same kind. But this one substantial thing does 
not intrinsically constitute the aggregate, nor is it some portion [of it]; it is rather understood 
to be essentially altogether different [from the aggregate or body]. In which way, then, is it 
required in order for this aggregate to subsist?12 
 
 
11 A VI, 4 B, 1668: “Hinc, nisi dentur substantiae quaedam indivisibiles corpora non forent realia, sed 
apparentiae tantum seu phaenomena sicut Iris, sublato quippe compositionis fundamento.”  
12 A VI, 4 B, 1670: “Pro multitudine lapidum A, B, C debet prius intelligi lapis A vel B vel C. At non 
idem est in anima quae cum aliis animabus non constituit corpus. Et videtur aliquid difficultatis esse in 
hac ratiocinatione. Dantur in universo aggregata substantiarum corpora. Ergo datur necessario aliquid 
quod sit unica indivisibilis substantia. Etenim tunc consequi legitime inferretur, si haec unitas intrinsice 
tanquam pars huiusmodi aggregatum componeret. Nam hoc unum substantiale non constituit in-
trinsece aggregatum, nec est portio aliqua, sed omnino essentialiter diversum intelligitur. Quomodo 
igitur requiritur ut subsistat hoc aggregatum?” 
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Notice that Fardella’s objection clearly shows that he takes Leibniz to be of the view that bodies are 
aggregates of souls, i.e., that the indivisible substances out of which any given body is aggregated, 
according to Leibniz, are souls.  
The first two sentences of this paragraph seem to constitute an argument against this view. 
But its precise import is unclear. Perhaps the argument is that, since the members of an aggregate 
must be understood to have some sort of order among themselves, and no such order is to be found 
among souls, a body cannot possibly be an aggregate of souls. In any case, the argument presented 
in the remainder of the paragraph is clearer. Here, Fardella seeks to undermine what he takes to 
be Leibniz’s argument for the claim that bodies are aggregates of souls. Specifically, he claims that 
Leibniz’s inference from the existence of bodies-as-aggregates to the existence of indivisible sub-
stances can work only if these indivisible substances intrinsically compose such aggregates as 
parts. But on Leibniz’s view this is not the case: indivisible substances do not intrinsically constitute 
an aggregate, nor are they “portions”—i.e., parts, presumably—of aggregates. And this latter 
claim, Fardella seems to suggest, is due to the fact that indivisible substances are essentially alto-
gether different from bodies. So, Fardella asks, what justification is there for thinking that bodies 
depend on indivisible substances for their existence? 
Leibniz begins his response to Fardella’s objection with that passage to which Garber appeals 
as evidence of Leibniz’s commitment to a realism that rejects any sort of reduction of corporeal 
substances to monads or simple substances. It reads as follows: 
 
I do not say that a body is composed of souls, nor that body is constituted by an aggregate 
of souls, but that it is constituted by an aggregate of substances. Moreover, the soul, properly 
and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form, or the primitive form 
existing in substances, the first act, the first active faculty. Moreover, the force of the argu-
ment consists in this, that a body is not a substance, but substances, or an aggregate of sub-
stances.13 
 
As I’ve said, there are good reasons to think that Garber is mistaken in his interpretation of this 
passage. For one thing, nothing that Leibniz says here requires that we take the substances which 
are said to compose a body to be corporeal substances. When Leibniz says that souls are not sub-
stances, but substantial forms or first active faculties, this pronouncement might be motivated, as 
 
13 A VI 4 B 1670: “Non dico corpus componi ex animabus, neque animarum aggregato corpus constitui; 
sed substantiarum. Anima autem proprie et accurate loquendo non est substantia, sed est forma sub-
stantialis seu forma primitiva inexistens substantiae, primus actus, prima facultas activa. Vis autem ar-
gumenti in hoc consistit, quod corpus non est substantia sed substantiae, seu substantiarum aggrega-
tum.” The translation is from: AG 105. 
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Adams claims, by Leibniz’s view that, strictly speaking, a soul is not itself a simple substance, but 
an entelechy or primitive active force, which constitutes a single substance only in conjunction with 
prime matter or primitive passive force. In other words, the substances which are said both to 
compose a body and to possess souls might be simple substances, rather than corporeal ones.  
That this is indeed the case is strongly suggested by a marginal comment that appears at this 
point in the manuscript of Leibniz’s notes on Fardella’s objections. It reads as follows: 
 
A body is not one substance, but substances, or an aggregate of substances; therefore, either 
there will be no substance or there will be a substance that is other than body. And either 
there will be nothing substantial in bodies, and so bodies will be only phenomena, or in body 
there are contained indivisible substances which are not in turn aggregates. But certainly 
those substances of which there is an aggregate constitute a body—or they ‘compose’ one, if 
someone wishes to speak so. And it is permitted by me for someone to call such things parts. 
But geometers give the name of part only to those constituents that are homogeneous with 
the whole, nor are they wont to call a point a part of a line. There is a difference between the 
relation of a line to points and [the relation] of a body to substances. For in intelligible lines 
there is no determinate division, but [only] indefinite possible ones; however, in things actual 
divisions have been made, and a resolution of matter into forms established. What points are in 
imaginary resolution souls are in true resolution. A line is not an aggregate of points, since in a 
line there are no points in actuality. But matter is an aggregate of substances, since in matter 
there are parts actually.14 
  
This marginal comment is useful in a way that the “proposition” which precedes the statement of 
Fardella’s objection is not, since we can be sure that this marginal comment was actually authored 
by Leibniz. It is interesting for a number of reasons. First, Leibniz claims that the substances of 
which bodies are aggregated are different from body. This is undoubtedly an echo of the earlier 
claim that these substances are heterogeneous with—different in kind from—the bodies that they 
constitute. (Indeed, one suspects that for Leibniz a homogeneous part of a body must itself be a 
body.) Second, Leibniz describes these substances as “indivisible,” which might naturally be taken 
 
14 My emphasis. A VI, 4 B, 1670-1: “Corpus non est una substantia, sed substantiae seu aggregatum 
substantiarum, ergo aut nulla erit substantia aut alia quam corpus. Et vel nihil substantialis inerit cor-
poribus adeoque corpora erunt phaenomena tantum, vel in corpore continentur substantiae indivis-
ibiles, quae non sint amplius aggregata. Utique autem substantiae illae quarum aggregatum est [con-
stituunt] corpus, vel si ita loqui velit aliquis componunt. Et si quis talia velit partes appellare per me 
licet. Geometrae tamen iis tantum constituentibus quae toti homogenea sunt nomen partis imponunt, 
neque punctum appellare solent lineae partem. Discrimen est inter relationem lineae ad puncta, et cor-
poris ad substantias. Nam in lineis intelligibilibus nulla est divisio determinata, sed possibiles indefini-
tae, in rebus vero actuales divisiones sunt factae, et instituta resolutio materiae in formas. Quod puncta 
sunt in resolutione imaginaria, id animae in vera. Linea non est aggregatum punctorum, quia in linea 
non sunt partes actu. Sed materia est aggregatum Substantiarum, quia in materia sunt parts actu.” A 
translation of this marginal comment does not appear in AG.  
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to imply that they are simple. Garber would likely deny this, however, since he, like Robert Sleigh, 
rejects any straightforward equation of simplicity and indivisibility in Leibniz on the grounds that 
in the correspondence with Arnauld Leibniz employs a notion of indivisibility according to which 
corporeal substances, understood as extended things, are indivisible.15 But that in the Fardella 
memo Leibniz does take the indivisible substances from which bodies are constituted to be simple 
is implied by the fact that in this passage Leibniz switches from speaking of indivisible substances 
to speaking of souls and forms. More specifically, Leibniz first compares the substances that com-
pose a body to the points that figure in a line, and this, it seems, in order to illustrate the lack of 
homogeneity obtaining between a substance and the body in which it figures. But he then qualifies 
the comparison on the grounds that points are not present in a line in the way that substances are 
present in a body—i.e., actually. Points are only potentially present in a line, becoming actual (sc. 
as termini) only on the occasion of the line’s division into segments. Matter, Leibniz adds, is by 
contrast actually resolved into “forms,” and “what points are in imaginary resolution souls are in 
true resolution.” 
Here, then, is a fairly strong indication that Leibniz understands the substances out of which 
bodies are aggregated to be simple or incorporeal. Leibniz’s talk of souls here, moreover, is not all 
that surprising for anyone who takes his position in the Fardella memo to be that bodies are com-
posed of simple substances, for the identification of a soul with a simple substance seems natural 
enough. (The same cannot be said for the claim that Leibniz is instead espousing the view that 
bodies are composed of genuinely extended corporeal substances.) For when Leibniz repudiates 
the view that bodies are aggregates of souls, and does so, it seems, on the grounds that souls are 
not substances, he prefaces the latter claim with a fairly strong qualification: “properly and accu-
rately speaking” (proprie et accurate loquendo), Leibniz says, the soul is a substantial form rather 
than a substance. And this qualification leaves open the possibility that in a loose sense, we can 
speak of the soul as a substance, according to Leibniz, and conversely, can  speak of the entire 
simple substance or monad as a soul. Certainly, in his later writings, Leibniz equivocates in pre-
cisely this way when it comes to the word “soul.” For example, in a letter of 20 June 1703 to De 
Volder Leibniz is careful to distinguish the soul or entelechy from the entire monad,16 but in the 
 
15 Garber: Leibniz: Body, pp. 84-6; Sleigh, pp. 106-10. 
16 GP II, 252/AG 177. 
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Monadology of 1714 he is prepared to call monads—or at least those monads that have memory and 
distinct perception—souls.17  
That Leibniz understands bodies to be aggregates of simple substances is also supported by 
the following consideration. On Garber’s reading, when Leibniz declares that bodies are not ag-
gregates of souls, we are to understand this denial as motivated by Leibniz’s view that the indivisi-
ble substances that are aggregated to form a body are extended corporeal substances. The problem 
with this, as Robert Adams has argued,18 is that on Garber’s interpretation it is hard to see why 
Leibniz would liken the relation that obtains between a body and the indivisible substances that 
make it up to the relation that obtains between a line and the points that are (potentially) present 
in it. Certainly the comparison is more apt if the indivisible substances at issue here are simple. 
Indeed, it’s not at all obvious that extended corporeal substances differ in kind from bodies in the 
way that Leibniz takes his indivisible substances to differ in kind from bodies.   
In fact, the situation for Garber’s view is actually worse than this, for in the remainder of the 
memo, Leibniz both (i) grants that animals, understood as bodies endowed with souls, are homo-
geneous with, and parts of, matter or body, and (ii) denies that animals, so understood, are sub-
stances at all. Consider the following passage:  
 
Therefore, either there is no substance, and so no substances, or there exists something other 
than body. Furthermore, although an aggregate of these substances constitutes a body, still, 
they do not constitute [a body] in the way a part does, just as points are not parts of lines, 
since a part is always homogeneous with its whole. However, the organic bodies of sub-
stances included in some mass of matter are parts of this mass. Thus in a fishpond there are 
many fish; and the humour of each fish is in turn like a kind of fishpond in which other fish, 
as it were, or animals of a different kind, make their home; and so on to infinity. […] But 
whether an animal can be said to be a part of matter, as a fish is a part of a fishpond, and 
cattle are part of a herd, is something that must be considered. And truly if an animal is 
conceived as a thing having parts, that is, as a divisible and destructible body endowed with 
a soul, I concede that it is a part of matter, since every part of matter has parts; but I do not 
concede that it is a substance or an indestructible thing. The same goes for the human being. 
For if a human being is this very I , he cannot be divided or perish, nor is he a homogeneous 
part of matter. But if the name ‘human being’ is understood of that which perishes, a human 
 
17 GP VI, 610/AG 215. Cf. Phemister, p. 96. Perhaps the synecdoche involved in Leibniz’s use of the 
word “soul” to refer to a simple substance is not surprising, given the fact that Leibniz, as Robert Adams 
suggests (see Adams, pp. 393-4), understands a monad’s prime matter not to be something real and 
positive, but rather the essential limitedness of the monad’s capacity to receive perfection (the limited-
ness of the monad’s “receptivity” for perfection), which limitation, according to Leibniz, explains both 
the confusion in a monad’s perceptions and, in the case of human minds, the possibility of sin even 
before the Fall. See GP VI, 119-21/H 140-2; GP VI, 383/H 384; GP VI, 210/H 228; GP VI, 602-3/AG 210. 
18 Adams, p. 275. 
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being will be a part of matter; but the former indestructible thing will be called soul, mind, 
I , which is not a part of matter.19 
 
Here, immediately after repeating the claim that the indivisible substances out of which a body is 
aggregated do not count as parts of a body because they differ in kind from body, Leibniz claims 
that the organic body of an animal, by contrast, can truly be said to be a part of some body or mass 
of matter. Indeed, Leibniz adds, this is actually the case, for just as there are many fish in a fishpond, 
so also are there many animals in the humour of a single fish, and in the humour of each such 
animal there are in turn more animals, and so on, to infinity. A little bit later in the passage, more-
over, Leibniz raises the question of whether an animal can be a part of matter, and his answer takes 
the form of a disjunction, inasmuch as animals can be understood in either of two ways. The first 
disjunct is: “if an animal is conceived as a thing having parts, that is, as a divisible and destructible 
body endowed with a soul, I concede that it is a part of matter; but I would not concede that it is a 
substance or an indestructible thing.” The second disjunct is framed in terms of human beings, 
after Leibniz implies that the foregoing claim about animals holds also of human beings. Specifi-
cally, he says that if a human being is identified with its soul, then it is indivisible and imperishable, 
and not homogeneous with matter.  
The clear implication here is that Leibniz is prepared to identify an animal with its soul or 
substantial form, in which case it is true to say that an animal is “indivisible and imperishable”—
i.e., a substance. But an animal, so understood, is not homogeneous with matter and (given the 
homogeneity requirement for parthood) not a part of matter or body, either. In other words, an 
animal, understood as a single soul or form, satisfies the description that Leibniz gives of the indi-
visible substances which constitute a body on his view. The same cannot be said of animals, un-
derstood as bodies endowed with forms, however, for Leibniz explicitly states in this passage that 
 
19 A VI, 4 B, 1670-1: “Ergo aut nulla datur substantia, adeoque nec substantiae, aut datur aliquid aliud 
quam corpus. Porro etsi harum substantiarum aggregatum constituat corpus, non tamen constituunt 
per modum partis, quia pars semper toti homogenea est, eodem modo ut puncta non sunt partes line-
arum. Interim corpora organica substantiarum in aliqua materiae massa inclusarum, sunt partes hujus 
massae. Ita in piscina insunt multi pisces; et humor cujusque piscis rursus est quasi piscina quaedam in 
qua velut alii pisces aut sui generis animalia stabulantur; et ita porro in infinitum. […] An vero dici 
possit animal esse partem materiae, uti piscis est pars piscinae, armentum gregis, considerandum. Et 
vero si animal concipiatur ut res habens partes, id est ut corpus anima praeditum, divisibile, destructi-
bile; concedam esse partem materiae, cum omnis materiae habeat partes; sed non concedam esse sub-
stantiam neque rem indestructibilem; idem est de Homine. Nam si homo sit ipsum Ego, neque dividi 
neque interire potest, neque pars est materiae homogenea; sin hominis appellatione intelligatur id quod 




animals, so conceived, are parts of matter, which presupposes that they do not differ in kind from 
matter or body and that they are not to be identified with the substances out of which bodies are 
aggregated on Leibniz’s view.20 
Needless to say, the fact that Leibniz here denies that animals, understood as bodies endowed 
with souls, are substances is a problem not only for Garber’s reading of the Fardella memo, but 
also for his larger thesis that in the 1680s and 1690s Leibniz advocated “a metaphysics grounded 
in corporeal substance, extended unities of matter and form”. To judge from what Leibniz says 
here, on his view the divisibility of an animal’s body prevents it from being a substance, which 
must be indivisible. 
The reader will have noticed the ellipse in the previous quotation. In the Fardella memo, the 
following passage appears between the two portions of the quotation that are separated by this 
ellipse: 
 
Therefore there are substances everywhere in matter, as points [are everywhere] in a line. 
And just as there is no portion of a line in which there are not infinite points, so also there is 
no portion of matter in which there are not infinite substances. However, just as a point is 
not a part of a line, but a line in which there is a point [is such a part], so also a soul is not a 
part of matter, but a body in which it exists [is such a part].21 
 
Notice that this passage appears immediately after Leibniz explains that in the humour of each fish 
there are other animals, and that in the humour of each such animal there are in turn more animals, 
and so on, to infinity. Here, Leibniz infers from this that there are therefore “substances everywhere 
in matter, as points [are everywhere] in lines.” But given Leibniz’s subsequent claim that an animal, 
understood as a body endowed with a soul, is not a substance, the substances at issue here cannot 
be the animals whose organic bodies were just said to admit of being parts of some mass of matter. 
That is, when Leibniz claims that every animal’s body contains other animals within it, his conclu-
sion that there are therefore substances everywhere in matter must be informed by the thought 
that where there is an animal, so also is there a soul or substantial form. The latter must be the 
substances that are said to be “everywhere” in matter.22  
 
20 Cf. Phemister, pp. 97-9. 
21 A VI, 4 B, 1671: “Ubique igitur in materia sunt substantiae, ut in linea puncta. Et ut nulla datur portio 
lineae, in qua non sint infinita puncta, ita nulla datur portio materiae in qua non sint infinitae substan-
tiae. Sed quemadmodum non punctum est pars lineae, sed linea in qua est punctum, ita quoque anima 
non est pars materiae, sed corpus cui inest.” 
22 Cf. Phemister, pp. 92-3. 
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Indeed, notice that Leibniz likens the substances that are everywhere in some portion of mat-
ter to points that are everywhere (though only potentially) in lines. And having done this, he then 
likens souls to points: just as a point is not a part of some line, Leibniz says, though a line in which 
that point figures can be a part of another line, so also a soul is not itself a part of matter, though a 
body that contains this soul can indeed be a part of some portion of matter. In other words, we 
here find Leibniz switching once again from talking of substances to talking of souls, and this in 
such a way as to suggest that the substances which are not parts of matter, on his view, just are 
souls.23  
Before leaving the Fardella memo, it is worth asking the question of how exactly Leibniz’s 
claims and arguments in it address the concerns articulated in Fardella’s objection. Remember that 
what Leibniz says in the memo is prompted by the following objection from Fardella. The inference 
that Leibniz makes, Fardella says, from the fact that bodies are aggregates, to the conclusion that 
there are indivisible substances, can work only if these indivisible substances intrinsically compose 
bodies in the way that parts compose a whole. But, Fardella continues, an indivisible substance, or 
soul, cannot intrinsically constitute a body in this way, given the fact that a part must be homoge-
neous with that whole of which it is a part. So why, Fardella asks, does the existence of bodies 
commit us to the existence of indivisible substances? In what sense do bodies depend for their 
existence on substances of this kind? 
Thus, Fardella, who not unreasonably takes Leibniz’s indivisible substances to be souls, un-
derstands Leibniz to be of the view that bodies are aggregates of souls. And it is precisely this view 
that Leibniz repudiates at the outset of the passage with which we’re concerned. But the question 
that arises here, as we’ve seen, is this: Does Leibniz repudiate the view because he understands the 
indivisible substances out of which bodies are composed to be extended corporeal substances, ra-
ther than simple or immaterial substances? Or does he repudiate it because, although he holds that 
bodies are composed of incorporeal substances, he rejects the view that souls themselves are simple 
substances, holding instead that souls are aspects or components of simple substances, i.e., things 
that simple substances have?  
When considered in its entirety, Leibniz’s answer strongly suggests that the latter is the case. 
For even though Leibniz denies, at the outset of his response, that bodies are aggregates of souls, 
he clearly doesn’t think that this suffices as an answer to Fardella’s objection. For shortly after 
 
23 Cf. Phemister, pp. 95-7. 
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claiming that souls are not substances, but rather substantial forms, Leibniz concedes that, on his 
view, although an aggregate of indivisible substances constitutes a body, these indivisible sub-
stances themselves do not constitute a body in the way that parts constitute a whole, since they are 
not homogeneous with the body or whole. But, Leibniz also seems to want to insist, this lack of 
homogeneity does not prevent them from constituting a body. In other words, it seems that Leibniz 
does not deny or abandon the view that makes his inference from bodies-as-aggregates to indi-
visible substances problematic for Fardella (i.e., that indivisible substances are not parts of, because 
not homogeneous with, bodies), as Garber’s reading of the memo might naturally be taken to sug-
gest (since, on Garber’s view, the claim that bodies are not aggregates of souls, but aggregates of 
substances, is the centerpiece of Leibniz’s response to Fardella24). Rather, Leibniz seems simply to 
deny Fardella’s claim that the inference from the fact that bodies are aggregates to the conclusion 
that there are indivisible substances can work only if these substances intrinsically compose bodies 
as parts compose a whole.  
 
Garber’s Arguments 
As I mentioned at the outset of this paper, in his earlier article Garber offers a couple of argu-
ments in support of his reading of the Fardella memo. They are offered partly in response both to 
Adams’ claim that the substances out of which Leibniz constitutes bodies are simple or immaterial, 
and to the further claim that when Leibniz denies that souls are substances, this is because he holds 
that a soul, strictly speaking, constitutes an immaterial substance only in conjunction with prime 
matter or primitive passive power. Adams, as I have mentioned, holds that this interpretation of 
Leibniz’s remarks is the natural one, given his appeal to the example of a point and its relation to 
a line.  
In response, Garber proposes that we “look at the context” of the memo, “look back at who 
Leibniz was talking with, and read the text as part of a conversation between Leibniz and that 
person, Fardella.”25 When we do this, Garber continues, we see that Fardella “was a Cartesian sci-
entist, mathematician, and philosopher, educated originally in scholastic Aristotelianism.”26 And 
this is important, he claims, because when Leibniz says to such a person that the soul is not a sub-
stance, but a substantial form or first active faculty, “this is going to be understood most naturally 
 
24 Garber, Leibniz: Body, p. 92. 




in terms of a traditionally Aristotelian conception of substance.”27 Indeed, Garber says, although it 
is possible to read Leibniz’s characterization of the soul in a “more idiosyncratically Leibnizian 
way, as Adams does,” still, if Leibniz’s position were such as Adams describes, he would surely 
have explained it to Fardella in a “somewhat different way.”28 For Leibniz certainly recognized that 
his characterization of the soul would be interpreted in an Aristotelian way by Fardella, as meaning 
that the soul is the substantial form or first act of a corporeal substance. In short, Garber claims, 
Leibniz’s exchange with Fardella here would have been pointless—hardly an effort at genuine 
communication—if he had meant what Adams takes him to have meant while nonetheless express-
ing himself in a way that he knew would be interpreted by Fardella in an Aristotelian fashion. 
But this argument suffers from several problems. For one, Garber assumes that Leibniz’s re-
sponse to Fardella’s objection was actually sent to Fardella, and in pretty much the form in which 
it appears in the memo. It’s not at all clear to me that this is the case. Second, Garber in effect 
assumes that there was no priming of Fardella by Leibniz to ensure that Fardella would understand 
Leibniz’s response on its own terms, without relying overly much on a prior familiarity with Aris-
totelian views and terminology. We know, however, that Leibniz had already discussed his views 
with Fardella before writing the memo, so it’s not as though in reading Leibniz’s response (assum-
ing he did) Fardella had no independent basis upon which to interpret what he was reading. Third, 
even if we ignore this last point, to suggest that Leibniz’s talk of substantial forms would invariably 
have been understood by Fardella in anything like orthodox Aristotelian terms seems unjustified. 
For even Descartes spoke of the human mind as a substantial form.29 Such unorthodox uses of 
Aristotelian terminology were probably not so rare in the late seventeenth century as to lead to the 
expectation that anyone who used such terminology to describe his or her own position was to be 
interpreted as espousing an Aristotelian doctrine. 
Garber’s second argument appeals to the fact that Fardella himself seems to have been 
tempted by the view that there are no bodies (understood as extended things) existing outside of 
perception or thought. Given this fact, Garber argues, “when in his objection to Leibniz’s proposi-
tion Fardella introduced the view that bodies were aggregates of souls, it gave Leibniz the perfect 
opportunity to say there was a real sense in which that was his view,” assuming that that was 
 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 
29 See Oeuvres de Descartes, publ. par C. Adam et P. Tannery, Paris, 1877-1901, réédition Paris, 1964-1974, 
vol. III, p. 503, translated into English in: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. by J. Cottingham, 
R. Stootfhoff, D. Murdoch (and A. Kenny, for vol. III), Cambridge, 1984-91, vol. III, pp. 207-8 
Pre-publication version 
 15 
indeed Leibniz’s view.30 The problem, Garber goes on to say, is that Leibniz did not seize the op-
portunity. And this, to Garber’s mind, suggests that in March of 1690 Leibniz was not of the opinion 
that bodies are in some sense reducible to souls or simple substances.    
Like Garber’s first argument, this second one suffers from several problems. First of all, it 
assumes that Leibniz was at this time familiar with Fardella’s doubts regarding the existence of 
bodies. But Garber gives us no reason to think that he was.31 Second, like his first argument, this 
one assumes that Leibniz’s response to Fardella’s objection was actually sent to Fardella in much 
the same form as it appears in the memo. Third, again like his first argument, this one assumes that 
in previous exchanges Leibniz had in no way prepared Fardella to understand his characterization 
of the soul as a substantial form in the way that Adams understands it. Fourth, what Garber is 
offering us here is simply an argument from omission. For that matter, given the findings of this 
paper’s previous section, one might well challenge Garber’s claim that Leibniz failed to reveal to 
Fardella that he understood bodies to be aggregates of souls or simple substances. 
 
The Documents Associated with the Fardella Memo  
The Fardella memo is the first of four documents printed in the Academy edition of Leibniz’s 
works under the heading “Communicata ex disputationibus cum Fardella” (A VI, 4 B, 1666-74). The 
fourth and shortest of these is an excerpt from Fardella’s Universae usualis mathematicae theoria (Ven-
ice, 1691) in which he presents a demonstration, said to be due to Leibniz, for the proposition that 
the part is less than the whole. It is not relevant to our discussion.  
The second and third texts, by contrast, do contain material pertinent to the topic of this paper. 
If I have so far concentrated exclusively on the Fardella memo, this was simply to show that a 
careful reading of the memo itself calls into doubt Garber’s reading of it. Thus, even if we ignore 
the second and third texts that appear along with the memo in the Academy edition of Leibniz’s 
works—on the grounds that, for one reason or another, it is a mistake to read the memo in the light 
of these two other documents—we still have good reason to conclude that, when responding to 
Fardella’s objections, Leibniz was of the view that bodies are aggregates of simple substances.  
 
30 Garber, “Fardella”, pp. 136-7. 
31 Garber mentions that in an appendix to a work published in 1691, Fardella argues that Descartes’ 
arguments for the existence of body fail to show that it is even probable that bodies exist, and that noth-
ing in the Bible requires that we believe in an external world of bodies (Garber, “Fardella”, p. 127). But 
this work was published about a year after Leibniz wrote the Fardella memo. 
Pre-publication version 
 16 
But in fact there are good grounds for thinking that these two documents are properly asso-
ciated with the Fardella memo. And, what’s more, the first especially supports the reading of the 
memo that has been presented here in this paper. Its first two paragraphs are strongly reminiscent 
of what Leibniz says in the memo, and for this reason don’t afford us much new material. Still, it’s 
worth quoting them here, if only to let the reader appreciate, for him- or herself, the affinity be-
tween this document and the Fardella memo: 
 
Body is not a substance, but an aggregate of substances. For it is clear that body is consti-
tuted from many things that are really distinct, as are a heap of wood, a pile of stones, a flock, 
an army, and a fishpond in which many fish swim; and each body is actually divided into 
many bodies contained within it.  
Now, there are no substances where there isn’t a substance, nor are there numbers where 
there are no unities, and so it is necessary that, aside from bodies, there be certain substances 
that are truly one or indivisible, from aggregates of which bodies are constituted.32 
 
Here again one finds Leibniz claiming that bodies are aggregates of substances. In the second par-
agraph, moreover, Leibniz seems to equate an aggregate with a mere plurality when he first affirms 
that a plurality of substances presupposes the existence of individual substances and then infers 
that, aside from bodies, there must be indivisible substances out of which bodies are aggregated.  
But what Leibniz goes on to say in the immediate wake of these two paragraphs provides 
further evidence in support of my interpretation of the Fardella memo. In particular, Leibniz im-
plies that the indivisible substances of the previous passage are indeed to be understood as simple 
or incorporeal: 
 
The error of the material philosophers consists in this, that, having recognized the need 
for unity, they sought substance in matter, as if there could be some body that was really one 
substance. And so they sought refuge in atoms as end-points of analysis. But since every 
body is composed of different substances, neither does it matter whether the parts cohere or 
not. Besides which no ground of indivisibility in atoms can be given.  
And so, since every body is a mass or aggregate of many bodies, no body is a substance. 
And hence substance is to be sought outside of corporeal nature.33 
 
32 A VI, 4 B, 1672: “Corpus non est substantia, sed aggregatum substantiarum. Constat enim ex pluribus 
realiter distinctis, quemadmodum strues lignorum, congeries lapidum, grex, exercitus, piscina in qua 
multi natant pisces; et unumquodque corpus actu divisum est in plura corpora contenta. 
“Jam non dantur substantiae, ubi non datur substantia, nec dantur numeri, nisi sint unitates, itaque 
necesse est praeter corpora dari substantias quasdam vere unas seu indivisibiles quarum aggregatis 
corpora constituantur.” 
33 A VI, 4 B, 1672: “Error philosophorum materialium in eo est, quod agnita necessitate unitatis, sub-
stantiam in materia quaesivere, quasi corpus ullum dari posset, quod revera esset una substantia. Itaque 




Here Leibniz claims that philosophers who recognize the need to found their ontology on true or 
genuine unities are wrong to think that such unities can be found in matter, e.g., as atoms. For one 
thing, even a supposedly indivisible atom is a plurality of things; the fact that its parts must cohere 
(given its alleged indivisibility) doesn’t change this fact. Second, it’s far from obvious how an atom 
could, after all, be genuinely indivisible. Accordingly, Leibniz concludes, no body is a substance, 
and “substance is to be sought outside of corporeal nature.”  
Of course, in the light of Leibniz’s view that bodies are aggregates of substances, it’s hard to 
deny that, when he claims that substance is to be sought outside of corporeal nature, he is advo-
cating some sort of reduction of bodies to simple or immaterial substances—which, in later years, 
he will refer to as “monads.” As if that’s not enough, in the immediate wake of the passage just 
quoted, Leibniz states:    
 
Substance is something truly one, indivisible, and therefore ingenerable and incorrupti-
ble, which is a subject of action and passion; and, to put it in a word, it is that very thing that 
I understand when I say ‘I’ (me) , which subsists while, my body being removed by parts 
(since my body is certainly in constant flux), I survive. No part of my body can be assigned 
which is necessary for my subsistence, although I am never without some united part of 
matter.  
However, I have need of an organic body, although there is nothing in it which is neces-
sary for my subsistence.  
I understand something analogous in every animal and, to put it in a word, in each thing 
that is a true substance and truly one.34 
 
Here, as in the Fardella memo itself, Leibniz gives, as an example of an indivisible substance, the 
soul of a human being—or that to which a human being refers when he or she says “I” or speaks 
of him- or herself. For Leibniz explains that this I  is both distinct from the body of a human being 
and something that persists even as the smaller bodies that go to make up a human body are 
 
substantiis, nec referat utrum partes cohaereant an non. Praeterquam quod ratio indivisibilitatis in at-
omis reddi non potest.  
“Itaque cum omne corpus sit massa seu aggregatum plurium corporum; nullum corpus est substantia; 
et proinde substantia extra corpoream naturam quaerenda est.”  
34 A VI, 4 B, 1672-3: “Est autem substantia aliquid vere unum, indivisibile, adeoque ingenerabile et 
incorruptibile, quod est sujectum Actionis et passionis; et ut verbo dicam, id ipsum quod intelligo cum 
dico Ego (moy), quod subsistit, etsi corpore meo per partes sublato, uti certe corpus meum in perpetuo 
fluxu est, superstite me. Nulla assignari potest pars corporis mei quae ad subsistentiam mei necessari 
sit, numquam tamen ego sum sine aliqua materiae parte unita. 
“Interim ego corpore organico opus habeo, quanquam nihil in eo sit, quod sit necessarium ad sub-
sistentiam mei.  
“Analogum aliquid in omni intelligo animali, et ut verbo dicam in omni substantia vera vereque una.” 
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gradually replaced by others. He also observes that although no single part of a human being is 
necessary for the subsistence of this I , the I  is nonetheless always joined to, and requires, some 
piece of matter. Something similar, Leibniz adds, goes for all animals.     
Now one might, perhaps, be tempted to read “substance” here as referring, not to a concrete 
substance, but to the substance (i.e., essence) of  a genuinely extended corporeal substance. But 
what Leibniz has to say in the immediate wake of this passage seems clearly to rule this out. For 
just as he claims, in his response to Fardella’s objections, that the substances that are aggregated so 
as to compose bodies are not to be taken as parts of bodies, since parts are homogeneous with 
their wholes (A VI, 4 B, 1671), so here Leibniz states: 
 
There are infinite simple substances or creatures in any particle of matter; and matter is 
composed of them, not as from parts, but as from constitutive principles, or immediate req-
uisites, just as points enter into the essence of the continuum, but not as parts; for it is not a 
part unless it is homogeneous with the whole; but substance is not homogeneous with matter 
or body, no more so than a point is with a line.35 
 
Note, first of all, that whereas Leibniz has spoken up till now in this second document of how 
matter is composed of indivisible substances, here he states that matter is composed of simple 
substances, which must necessarily be incorporeal or immaterial. That is to say, Garber’s claim that 
the indivisible substances of the Fardella memo and its associated texts are genuinely extended 
corporeal substances is inconsistent with this passage, as Donald Rutherford has already ob-
served.36 Certainly in this passage Leibniz does indeed seem to equate indivisibility with simplic-
ity.  
Also pertinent to the question at issue here is what Leibniz says in the remainder of this, the 
second document classed by the editors of the Academy edition under the heading “Communicata 
ex disputationibus cum Fardella.” It reads as follows: 
 
In every substance there is nothing other than that nature or primitive force from which 
the series of its internal operations follows.  
From any state of a substance or its nature one can come to know the series, or all of its 
states past and future.  
 
35 A VI, 4 B, 1673: “Infinitae autem sunt substantiae simplices seu creaturae in qualibet materiae partic-
ula; et componitur ex illis materia, non tanquam ex partibus, sed tanquam ex principiis constitutivis, 
seu requisitis immediatis, prorsus ut puncta continui essentiam ingrediuntur non tamen ut partes; 
neque enim pars est, nisi quod toti homogeneum est, sed substantia materiae seu corpori homogenea 
non est; non magis quam lineae punctum.” 
36 Rutherford, pp. 168-9. 
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Moreover, any substance involves the whole universe, and one can come to know from 
its state the states of other substances as well. 
The series of different substances agree perfectly with each other, and each expresses the 
whole universe in its own way. And in this agreement consists the union of the soul and 
body, and also that which we call the operation of substances outside themselves.  
The more perfect a substance is, the more distinctly does it express the universe.37 
 
Note, first of all, that Leibniz here reduces the external operations of substances to an agreement 
that is said to obtain among the series of states of different substances. It seems hard to deny that 
with this Leibniz means to deny that substances operate externally on each other, the agreement in 
question being an aspect of the pre-established harmony. Consistent with this, Leibniz feels the 
need to posit in a substance only a primitive force “from which the series of its internal operations 
follows.” The implication here is that a substance’s states are one and all internal, that is to say, 
perceptual—hence the claim that the more perfect the substance, the more distinctly it expresses 
the universe. (Certainly it’s not easy to see how a body might express the universe more or less 
distinctly.) Here, then, Leibniz seems to leave no room for the kinds of physical interactions that 
Garber attributes to Leibniz’s indivisible substances.  
There are, then, very good reasons to think that in the notes on Fardella’s objections Leibniz 
takes bodies to be aggregates of simple substances. But one more consideration in support of this 
conclusion can be offered here. Note that if in fact Leibniz’s view is that bodies are aggregates of 
genuinely extended corporeal substances, these corporeal substances must have souls or some-
thing analogous to souls. What’s more, a soul or soul-analogue must be thought to be related to 
the body of a corporeal substance in one of two ways. We must either take Leibniz to be of the view 
that the soul is related to the body as one substance is related to an aggregate of others, as Daniel 
Garber thinks we should38; or we must hold that the soul is related to the body in the way envi-
sioned by what Robert Sleigh calls “the unmodified corporeal substance theory,” according to 
 
37 A VI, 4 B, 1673: “In omni substantia nihil aliud est quam natura illa seu vis primitiva, ex qua sequitur 
series operationum ejus internarum.  
“Ex quolibet statu substantiae seu natura ejus cognosci potest series, seu omnes ejus status praeteriti et 
futuri. 
“Praeterea quaevis substantia involvit totum universum, et cognosci potest ex statu ejus etiam status 
aliarum. 
“Diversarum substantiarum series perfecte consentiunt inter se, et unaquaeque exprimit totum univer-
sum secundum modum suum. Et in hoc consensu consistit unio animae et corporis, itemque id quod 
operationem substantiarum extra se appellamus.  
“Quo perfectior substantia est, eo distinctius exprimit universum.” 
38 See Garber: Leibniz: Body, p. 87. 
Pre-publication version 
 20 
which neither the soul nor the body of a corporeal substance is itself a substance.39 The problem is 
that neither position is consistent with other things that Leibniz says both in the Fardella memo 
and in the document under consideration here. Garber’s position seems straightforwardly to be 
ruled out by Leibniz’s claim in the memo that souls are not substances40. On the other hand, the 
unmodified corporeal substance theory, which, according to Sleigh, informs Leibniz’s notes on 
Fardella, is inconsistent with something that Leibniz says in the passage just quoted—namely, that 
the union of soul and body is to be explained in terms of the perfect agreement obtaining between 
the series of each and every substance’s internal operations, i.e., in terms of the hypothesis of con-
comitance or doctrine of pre-established harmony. For if the soul of a corporeal substance is not 
itself a substance, as Sleigh’s unmodified corporeal substance theory holds, the theory of pre-es-
tablished harmony cannot serve to explain its union with the body, since this theory is a theory 
about the apparent mutual influence of created substances on each other. Indeed, one might doubt 
whether the problem of soul-body union can even arise on the unmodified corporeal substance 
theory. The only option that seems left to us, then, is to conclude that Leibniz equivocates in his 
use of the term “soul” in the way alleged above—to refer both to a simple substance and to a mere 
aspect of a simple or immaterial substance.  
The third document that appears in the Academy edition under the heading “Communicata ex 
disputationibus cum Fardella” is quite brief. In one of its paragraphs we find Leibniz repeating one 
of the claims made in the second document: 
 
Those who established atoms saw part of the truth. For they recognized that one had to arrive 
at some one indivisible thing which is the basis of a multitude, but they erred in that they 
sought unity in matter and thought that there could be a body which was truly a single, 
indivisible substance.41 
 
Although Leibniz doesn’t explicitly say so, the suggestion here, once again, is that substance is to 
be sought outside of corporeal nature. Less straightforward is the opening paragraph of the third 
document, which immediately precedes the one just quoted: 
 
 
39 See Sleigh, p. 100. 
40 Although Garber recognizes that Leibniz’s claim that souls are not substances is inconsistent with the 
view that he attributes to Leibniz, he declares that he won’t address the inconsistency. See Garber: Leib-
niz: Body, p. 92.  
41 A VI, 4 B, 1674: “Qui Atomos stabilivere, viderunt partem veritatis. Agnoverunt enim ad unum al-
iquid indivisibile deviniendum esse, quod sit basis multitudinis, sed in eo errarunt, quod unitatem in 
materia quaesiverunt, credideruntque posse corpus dari quod vere sit substantia una indivisibilis.” 
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There is a difference between the way a line is constituted from points and the way matter 
is constituted from the substances that are in it, because the number of points is not determi-
nate, but the number of substances, even if it is infinite, is nevertheless certain and determi-
nate, for it arises from the actual division of matter, and not from a possible division only. 
For matter is not divided in all possible ways, but with some definite proportions preserved, 
as a machine, a fishpond, a flock. A line is not an aggregate of points even though a body is 
an aggregate of substances.42 
 
Although the exact import of this paragraph isn’t obvious, it might plausibly be argued that Leibniz 
is here concerned to identify one consequence of a difference, mentioned already in the Fardella 
memo, between (i) the relation that a point bears to a line and (ii) the relation that a substance bears 
to a body. It will be remembered that in the memo Leibniz claimed that, unlike the substances 
present in a body, points are present in a line only potentially, becoming actual (as termini) only 
on the occasion of the line’s division into segments. This might well be what Leibniz has in mind 
here when he says that the number of points in a line is indeterminate, while the number of sub-
stances in a body is determinate, even if infinite, since the number of substances in a body arises 
from the actual division of matter, and not merely from a possible division. The possible division 
mentioned here might be that division of a line which gives rise to points. The suggestion, then, 
might be that the number of points in a line is indeterminate, since it is always possible to divide a 
line into smaller parts, whereas the number of substances in a body is determinate, since this num-
ber equals the number of parts into which a chunk of matter is actually divided.  
Interesting here is the fact that Leibniz then goes on to claim that matter is not divided in all 
possible ways, but with certain proportions preserved, as in the case of a machine, a fishpond, or 
a flock. The suggestion seems to be that a chunk of matter’s actual divisions are none other than its 
divisions into living things, the actual divisions of these living things’ bodies into yet smaller living 
things, and so on, ad infinitum. Notice, however, that Leibniz makes no mention here of corporeal 
substances. So when Leibniz implies that the number of substances in a chunk of matter equals the 
number of living things in it, this may simply be due to the fact that on his view the set of created 
living things (understood as bodies endowed with souls) and the set of created simple substances 
are equinumerous.  
 
42 A VI, 4 B, 1673-4: “Hoc interest inter modum quo Linea constituitur punctis, et quo Materia constitu-
itur ex substantiis quae in ea sunt, quod punctorum numerus non est determinatus, at substantiarum 
numerus etsi infinitus sit tamen est certus ac determinatus, nascitur enim ex actuali divisione materiae 
non ex possibili tantum. Neque enim materia divisa est omnibus modis possibilibus, sed certis qui-
busdam proportionibus servatis, ut Machina, piscina, grex. Linea non est aggregatum punctorum cum 
tamen corpus sit aggregatum substantiarum.” 
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This is not to say that in this document Leibniz slams the door, once and for all, on the possi-
bility of recognizing corporeal substances, in some sense. (Indeed, we know that he toys with the 
idea of recognizing corporeal substances later, in the correspondence with Des Bosses.) But given 
the evidence, it seems clear that if Leibniz was at this time considering the possibility of admitting 
corporeal substances into his system, they must have been conceived by him to be reducible to 
simple substances—or to simple substances taken together with some unifying reality. (Given the 
foregoing examination of the Fardella memo and its associated texts, it seems unlikely, at least, that 
in 1690 Leibniz should have contemplated a shift to the robust realism that Garber attributes to 
him.) I say this because something that Leibniz says at the very end of the third document might 
be taken to suggest that he was toying with the idea of admitting corporeal substances, so under-
stood, into his system, and that he recognized the need for something other than souls or monads—
some “unifying reality” like the vinculum substantiale of his correspondence with Des Bosses, per-
haps—if indeed he was to do so. The comment in question reads: “One must consider whether 
there must be something in matter besides those indivisible substances.”43  
But what sort of entity Leibniz had in mind in making this comment is something that we’ll 
probably never know. At any rate, this much seems indisputable: in the Fardella memo and the 
two other documents examined here, Leibniz’s stated position is that bodies are aggregates of sim-
ple—rather than corporeal—substances.44 
 
Conclusion  
As mentioned at the outset of this paper, Garber’s reading of the Fardella memo is offered in 
support of his larger thesis that between the late 1670s and the late 1690s Leibniz “had not yet come 
upon the monadological metaphysics that will characterize his later years,” and that what one finds 
in this period instead is “a metaphysics grounded in corporeal substance, extended unities of mat-
ter and form.” My reading of the Fardella memo and the two documents associated with it shows, 
 
43 A VI, 4 B, 1674: “Considerandum an non debeat aliquid esse in Materia praeter substantias illas indi-
visibiles.” 
44 Recall that in the Fardella memo, Leibniz expressly denies that animals and plants, understood as 
bodies endowed with souls, are substances. So it can’t be the case that in the Fardella memo a body is 
understood by Leibniz to be an aggregate of corporeal substances in the sense of an aggregate of sub-
stantially unified collections containing simple substances. But even if it were the case, Garber’s thesis 
would still be false, for Garber’s claim (at least in his book) is not that Leibniz endorses such a weak 
realism in the Fardella memo, but that he endorses a “strong realism” which affirms the existence of 
extended corporeal substances that don’t admit of being reduced to simple or incorporeal substances. 
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at the very least, that by 1690 the monadology was not a discovery that still lay in the future. To 
the contrary, the Fardella memo is in fact to be read as actually asserting that bodies are aggregates 
of simple substances, notwithstanding Leibniz’s claim in it that bodies are not aggregates of souls, 
but aggregates of substances. This claim, it turns out, can only be motivated by the fact that Leib-
niz’s considered view is that a soul constitutes a simple substance only in conjunction with prime 
matter or primitive passive power. But notwithstanding this, as we have seen, Leibniz himself 
doesn’t scruple to speak of a true resolution of bodies into souls in one of the memo’s marginal 
notes. Moreover, in one of two associated texts he explicitly claims that matter is constituted from 
simple substances, and that substances are to be sought outside of corporeal nature. 
To what extent Garber’s larger thesis is undermined by my reading of the Fardella memo is 
too large a question to be addressed here. But it does seem to me that the memo and its associated 
texts are not the only works from Leibniz’s middle period that call this thesis into doubt. There is, 
for example, the fact that in a letter of 1686 to Arnauld Leibniz states that souls or substantial forms 
are “the only true complete beings,” i.e., the only true substances.45 I don’t mean to suggest, how-
ever, that this text and Leibniz’s notes on Fardella by themselves warrant the conclusion that Leib-
niz consistently espoused some form of idealism in the 1680s and 1690s. In fact, I would go so far 
as to grant that, on the whole, the texts of the 1680s and 90s present serious challenges to anyone 
wishing to argue that in this period Leibniz’s metaphysics is more or less that of the Monadology. 
But I do think that the case for idealism in Leibniz’s middle years can still be made, notwithstand-
ing the significant obstacles set up by the case that Garber has offered for a realist reading of Leib-
niz’s philosophical work in the 1680s and 90s. 
 
 
45 A II, 2, 121: “les seuls estres accomplis veritables.” For a text in which Leibniz says that complete 
beings (entia completa)  are substances, see A VI, 4 B, 390 (1680-1684 [?]). As for the issue of whether 
Leibniz means the French expression “estre accompli” to be equivalent to the Latin expression “ens com-
pletum” consider the following passage: “En effect la notion d’une substance individuelle, ou d’un estre 
accompli n’est autre chose que cela, sçavoir une notion assez complete, pour en pouvoir deduire tout ce 
qu’on peut attribuer au meme sujet” (“In fact, the notion of an individual substance, or of a complete 
being, is nothing other than that, namely, a notion sufficiently complete to enable one to deduce from it 
everything that can be attributed to the same subject”) (A II, 2, 57 [1686]). At A II, 2, 45/AG 70 (1686), 
moreover, Leibniz contrasts a “notion incomplete ou abstraite” with a “notion accomplie.” 
